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Abstract
Ad hoc networks are self-configuring networks of mobile nodes, connected by wireless links. If a destination node is
beyond the transmission range of an origin node, then the nodes must cooperate to provide a multi-hop route. Any
node can act as a sender, receiver or transit node. It is clear that it is in a node’s interest to be a sender or receiver,
but it is less clear what the value is of forwarding traffic on behalf of other nodes. The nodes should therefore be given
incentives to act as transit nodes, otherwise the network would fail to function. A way to do so is by introducing for
each node a credit balance, where nodes use credits to pay for the costs of sending their own traffic, and earn credits
by forwarding traffic from other nodes.
However, nodes that are located near the edge of the network will attract little transit traffic and earn few credits.
In contrast, nodes located near the centroid of the network will attract transit traffic and earn credits. We investigate
various ways of providing nodes near the edge of the network with preferential treatment in order to improve their
credit balance and their throughputs.
We next focus on the situation where each node can move to improve its utility expressed in terms of either credit
balance or throughput. Here radio interference plays an important role, as it defines an interesting trade-off: nodes
may prefer to be close together in order to reduce the power needed to transmit data, but on the other hand proximity
increases radio interference, and has therefore a negative effect on connectivity. Simulation experiments reveal that
the positions of the nodes converge to non-trivial optimal positions on 2D and 3D surfaces.
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1. Introduction
Ad hoc networks are self-configuring networks
of mobile nodes, connected by wireless links. They
enable infrastructure-free communication: no fixed
equipment is needed, but instead each node acts
as a router. An excellent survey on ad hoc net-
works, with special emphasis on Quality-of-Service
aspects, is given in [1].
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Any node can act as a sender, receiver or tran-
sit node. Although a node will benefit from being a
sender or a receiver, it is less clear how nodes bene-
fit from forwarding traffic on behalf of other nodes.
However, if nodes do not act as transit nodes, the ad
hoc network would fail to function. Therefore a cru-
cial question is: how can nodes be given incentives
to act as transit nodes?
This question was studied in several papers.
Crowcroft et al. [2] rely on earlier work on pricing
and rate control [3, 4] to devise such an incentive
scheme. In their framework, each node has a credit
balance that determines how much the node can
spend on transmission resources in the next time
interval. For each node there are two resources:
bandwidth and power, each with its own price. The
price of the resource increases when the resource is
scarce, and decreases when the resource is abun-
dant. When a call arrives, given the current prices,
it is connected along the least cost route to its des-
tination. At the same time the node earns credits
when acting as a source, destination or transit node.
The interplay between the prices, rate allocations,
and credit balances is such that global stability of
the system is achieved. Importantly, such a scheme
is decentralized: no central controller is needed,
and the scheme therefore has favourable scalability
properties.
Chen et al. [5] consider a setting in which there
are several types of nodes: some wish to communi-
cate (‘clients’), while others do not, but are willing
to serve as relay nodes. The clients cannot reach the
base station directly, and can use the relay nodes to
forward their traffic, in which case the relay nodes
should be provided with an incentive to do so. Mech-
anisms are proposed to pay the relay nodes for the
service they deliver. Every relay node is entitled to
set its own price at any point in time: the lower the
number of relay nodes the more substantial their
market power. Interestingly, the authors consider a
situation both with and without communication be-
tween the relay nodes. Thus [5] unlike [2] assumes
an infrastructure where the relay nodes – in the case
where they communicate amongst each other – form
an oligopoly and set their prices such that their prof-
its are maximised, which does not necessarily pro-
mote resource usage to the largest extent possible
as in [2].
According to the credit distribution scheme pro-
posed in [2], nodes acquire credits by providing re-
sources to relay calls from other nodes. Nodes that
spend their resources in providing a transit service
for traffic originating elsewhere will in return receive
a higher resource allocation when they need tran-
sit services themselves in the future. Such a proto-
col ensures mutual cooperation. However, one con-
sequence of this mutual cooperation is that nodes
located near the edge of the network which attract
little transit traffic will earn few credits: these nodes
will have a low data rate for originating calls. In
contrast, nodes located near the centroid of the net-
work will attract transit traffic and will earn a rela-
tively large amount of credits: these nodes will have
a large data rate for originating calls. In this paper
we will investigate various ways of modifying this
concept of mutual cooperation by providing nodes
near the edge of the network with preferential treat-
ment in order to improve their credit balances and
their throughputs.
One shortcoming of [2], admitted by its authors,
was that it did not incorporate a model of radio in-
terference. As a result, in the framework of [2] it al-
ways helps for nodes to be closer together, as this
reduces the power needed to transmit data. The re-
ality, however, is that proximity may have a nega-
tive effect on connectivity: the increased radio in-
terference may lead to certain nodes in the network
becoming disconnected. The paper [6], which can be
regarded as a predecessor of [2], does incorporate
radio interference, but it does so in a rather partial
way.
It may be desirable to allow the nodes to move
to different locations in order to improve their util-
ities expressed, for instance in terms of through-
put, or, in the framework of [2], credit balance; we
call this “autonomous motion”. The idea is that the
nodes evaluate the radio conditions in their immedi-
ate neighbourhood, and then decide in which direc-
tion to move. In the framework of [2], without radio
interference modelled, one would expect that this
would lead to the nodes “clumping together”. In a
more realistic setting with radio interference mod-
elled, it is not a priori clear what will happen, as
there is a trade off between the nodes being close to-
gether (thus reducing the power needed to transmit
data) and the nodes being further apart (thus reduc-
ing radio interference and improving connectivity).
In this paper we investigate autonomous motion in
a model that incorporates radio interference. Sim-
ulation experiments reveal that several non-trivial
motion patterns appear.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents a summary of the mobile
ad hoc network model and describes the radio inter-
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ference model, the bandwidth and power congestion
prices, flow allocation and the bandwidth and power
usage. Section 3 investigates several ways for redis-
tributing credits from those nodes that are over-
provisioned with an above-average amount of cred-
its to those nodes that have an under-provision of
credits. Section 4 presents a model that describes
the motion of the nodes and presents insights con-
cerning the effect of radio interference on the mo-
tion of the nodes. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
An initial version of part of Section 4 has appeared
in [7].
2. A summary of the model
This section presents a summary of the features
of the mobile ad hoc network model which is based
on [2]. We present the model in sufficient detail for
the reader to follow the experimental results pre-
sented below: we refer to [2] for further background
on the model.
2.1. Model basics
Consider an ad hoc network consisting of a set of
mobile nodes located on a 2-dimensional surface. An
origin node transmits to a destination node. If the
destination node is beyond the transmission range
of the origin node, then the other nodes must co-
operate to provide a multi-hop route. This raises
the question as to why an intermediate node on the
route would expend bandwidth and power in for-
warding transit traffic without being compensated?
The main idea behind the model of Crowcroft et
al. [2] is that transit nodes are rewarded for forward-
ing traffic, thus creating incentives for collaboration,
and the rewards are continuously adjusted such that
the network converges towards an operating point
which maximises the overall data rates.
The setup of [2] can be summarized as follows.
There are two scarce resources: bandwidth and
power. Each node has a target bandwidth and a
target power usage. When a node acts as a tran-
sit or destination node, it obtains compensation in
the form of credits for the congestion costs of the
bandwidth and power resources consumed. This
provides the basis for mutual cooperation: a node
can use its credits (which it receives for making its
own resources available to be used by other mem-
bers of the community) to pay for the bandwidth
and power congestion costs incurred when it sends
its own traffic. New calls are connected on the
least cost routes. The bandwidth and power con-
gestion prices are updated at regular intervals, and
are meant to reflect the level of congestion at any
specific node along any specific route.
Our model extends the model of Crowcroft et
al. [2] by including a representation of radio interfer-
ence among the nodes, and by allowing the nodes to
move in order to improve the values of their utilities.
In order to provide the reader with an insight as
to how the system dynamics work, we first briefly
sketch in Section 2.2 how the bandwidth prices and
bandwidth usages mutually affect each other (sim-
ilar arguments apply to the power prices and the
power usages). A detailed description of the model
is then given in Sections 2.3 through 2.9.
2.2. System dynamics
Consider an ad hoc network consisting of nodes 0,
1 and 2 located at coordinates (25, 50), (50, 30) and
(40, 70) on a 100×100 square.We consider what hap-
pens within one simulated time unit during which
three calls arrive. The first call arrives at node 2 at
time 0.27, transmits to node 1 and departs at time
0.49; the second call arrives at node 0 at time 0.41,
transmits to node 2 and is still present at time 1; the
third call arrives at node 2 at time 0.59, transmits
to node 0 and is still present at time 1. All calls are
directly connected so there is no relay via a third
node. The plots in Fig. 1 are read as follows.
– Time 0.0 to 0.27. No calls are present and no
bandwidth is in use: the price of bandwidth at
each node decreases from its initial value of 0.01
and the credit balance at each node is constant.
– Time 0.27 to 0.41. The first call is in service.
The bandwidth in use at nodes 1 and 2 increases
rapidly. The price of bandwidth at nodes 1 and 2
increases and the bandwidth in use at nodes 1
and 2 converges towards their target bandwidth
usages of 10 bandwidth units (see the remark be-
low). The price of bandwidth at the idle node 0
continues to decrease. Node 1 is receiving traf-
fic therefore its credit balance increases. Node 2
is transmitting traffic therefore its credit balance
decreases.
– Time 0.41 to 0.49. The second call is in service.
The bandwidth in use at nodes 0 and 2 increases
rapidly. From now onwards nodes 0 and 2 are in
use and the price of bandwidth at these nodes
increases. The bandwidth in use at nodes 0 and 2
3
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
0.055
0.060
Ba
n
dw
id
th
 
pr
ic
e
Time (seconds)
 Node 0
 Node 1
 Node 2
(a) Bandwidth prices
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ba
n
dw
id
th
 
u
sa
ge
Time (seconds)
 Node 0
 Node 1
 Node 2
(b) Bandwidth usage
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
Cr
ed
it 
ba
la
n
ce
 
Time (seconds)
 Node 0
 Node 1
 Node 2
(c) Credit balance
Fig. 1. The system dynamics of a 3-node network as assigned
by the model derived from Crowcroft et al. [2].
converges to 10 bandwidth units.
Node 2 receives more traffic that it sends (com-
pare the bandwidth used by node 0 – this is the
traffic received by node 2 – with the bandwidth
used by node 1 – this is the traffic sent by node 2):
the credit balance at node 2 therefore increases.
– Time 0.49 to 1.0. The first call terminates at
time 0.49. From now onwards node 1 is idle: the
bandwidth in use at nodes 1 and 2 decreases
rapidly. Since node 1 is idle, the credit balance at
node 1 is constant and the price of bandwidth at
node 1 decreases.
The third call arrives at time 0.59 and transmits
from node 2 to node 0. The bandwidth in use at
nodes 0 and 2 increases rapidly The price of band-
width at nodes 0 and 2 increases. The bandwidth
in use at nodes 0 and 2 converges towards their
target bandwidth usages of 10 bandwidth units.
Node 0 transmits at a higher rate than node 2.
This is because when node 0 starts transmitting
call 2 at time 0.41 it can use all of the bandwidth
at node 0, whereas when node 2 starts transmit-
ting call 3 at time 0.59 it can only use that part
of the bandwidth at node 2 that is not being used
to receive call 2. Node 2 thus receives more traffic
than it sends. The credit balance at node 2 there-
fore increases. Likewise node 0 sends more traf-
fic than it receives. The credit balance at node 0
therefore decreases.
The net shift of credit from node 0 to node 2
places a bound on how long node 0 can maintain
the traffic rate of call 2 which significantly exceeds
the traffic rate of call 3. To continue transmitting
traffic in the long run, node 0 must either earn
credits by making more of its bandwidth avail-
able to the community, or it must acquire credits
by other means, for example by “buying” credits
from node 2 and monetarily compensating node 2
for the credits acquired.
– Remark. The equations which determine the av-
erage bandwidth in use at each node are evalu-
ated at discrete time intervals. The average band-
width in use can differ from the target bandwidth
usage. This effect is exaggerated when solving a
small model with a few nodes and a few calls in
service. Thus Fig. 1(b) shows that the average
bandwidth in use exceeds the target bandwidth
usage for short periods of time. This effect is less
evident, though still present, when solving larger
models. However, the model ensures that the av-
erage bandwidth in use at each node will converge
towards a value that does not exceed the target
bandwidth usage.
In summary, the control mechanism is designed such
that the nodes are given incentives to efficiently use
their resources. The resource prices reflect the cur-
rent level of congestion: when resources are scarce
the prices increase, when resources are abundant the
prices decrease.
Having introduced the main ideas behind the
model, we now systematically explain its elements
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in more detail. The reader is referred to the glossary
at the end of the paper for a complete list of the
notation used.
2.3. The radio interference model
The original model [2] does not contain a descrip-
tion of radio interference. Our model takes radio in-
terference into account as follows.
Node i can reach node j when the signal received
by node j from node i is strong enough to be suc-
cessfully decoded. Consider a call (the “tagged”
call) in service at node i 6= D(r) on route r where
D(r) denotes the destination node of route r. Let
fr(i) denote the node that node i forwards traffic
to on route r. The strength of the signal received at
node j = fr(i) from the tagged call is piyrℓ(zi − zj)
where pi is the power radiated per unit flow by the
tagged call at node i, yr is the flow along route r,
and the attenuation function is given by ℓ(zi−zj) =
kd−u, where u = 3.52 is an attenuation factor,
k = 1.82×10−14 is a scale factor and d = ||zi−zj ||2
is the Euclidean distance between zi and zj .
Let W denote the chip rate of the spreading
code and let N0 denote the power of the thermal
background noise. The signal-to-interference ratio
is σri [10] – see also [8, 9, 11]
σri =
W
yr
piyrℓ(zi − zj)
N0 + η(A+B)
(1)
where 0 < η ≤ 1 represents the effect of the radio
interference (in terms of the orthogonality of the
codes),
A =
∑
k 6=i,j
pkℓ(zk − zj)
∑
r∈RS(k)
fr(k)=j
yr
is the interfering signal at node j arising from calls
originating at the neighbours k of node j where
RS(k) is the set of routes that originate at node k,
and
B =
∑
k 6=j
pkℓ(zk − zj)
∑
r∈RT (k)
fr(k)=j
yr
is the interfering signal at node j arising from calls
transiting the neighbours k of node j whereRT (k) is
the set of routes that transit node k. Note that the
node antennae are assumed to be directional, and
the effectiveness of the orthogonal coding scheme is
assumed to be represented by the term η in Eqn. (1):
node k will therefore contribute to the interfering
signal at node j only if fr(k) = j so that nodes adja-
cent to node j whose transmissions are not directed
at node j do not interfere with the tagged call at
node j.
We next describe the relationship between the ef-
fective (net) transmission rate yr on route r, and
the actual (gross) transmission rate Yri between the
nodes i and j = fr(i) on route r. If the effective
rate, at some point in time is yr, it requires a gross
rate of Yri = yr/P (σri), where P (σri) denotes the
packet success probability. We compute P (σri) as
follows [10]. We first determine
P¯ (σri) =
(
1− 0.5e−σri
)L
where L is the packet size in bits. However, P¯ (σri)
cannot be the correct packet success probability
when yr/P¯ (σri) exceeds W . Taking also into ac-
count the fact that probabilities cannot be larger
than 1, this leads to the following expression for the
packet loss probability
P (σri) := min(1,max(yr/W, P¯ (σri))).
We assume that nodes i and j are within transmis-
sion range and can reach each other if the packet
success probability P (σri) ≥ 0.9.
2.4. The bandwidth and power congestion prices
The nodes make decentralized decisions on route
selection and flow allocation based on congestion
prices announced by the nodes.
The congestion prices are determined [2] by two
first-order linear differential equations (DE s): the
first DE describes the price of power and the second
DE describes the price of bandwidth. The solutions
of the DE s yield prices that are constant when the
resource is fully utilized, increase when the resource
is over-utilized and decrease when the resource is
under-utilized, in line with the principles explained
in Section 2.2, thus facilitating the target resource
usage. Other DE s could have been used, but we
use the DE s presented in [2]. In view of the find-
ings of [4], these DEs are to be preferred since they
are designed to perform optimally in terms of max-
imizing the social welfare, under minimal regularity
conditions on the utility functions involved, subject
to the restrictions on the target resource usages im-
posed by the nodes.
We first consider the power congestion price
µPj (t). Let γj(t) be the power in use at node j at
time t and Γj be the target power usage at node j.
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If γj(t) exceeds Γj it means that the current power
consumption at node j exceeds the target power
usage at node j and the price of power at node j
should increase. Similarly, the price of power should
decrease when γj(t) < Γj . This principle can be
implemented through the DE
d
dt
µPj (t) = κµ
P
j (t)
γj(t)− Γj
Γj
(2)
with initial value µPj (0) = 1 where κ is a constant
of dimension seconds−1. Likewise, the bandwidth
congestion price µBj (t) satisfies the DE
d
dt
µBj (t) = κµ
B
j (t)
cj(t)− Cj
Cj
(3)
with initial value µBj (0) = 1 where cj(t) is the band-
width in use at node j at time t and Cj is the target
bandwidth usage at node j. Expressions for evalu-
ating γj(t) and cj(t) are presented in Section 2.9.
The DE for the bandwidth congestion price can
be approximately evaluated through
µBj (t+∆)≈ µ
B
j (t)
(
1 + κ∆
(
cj(t)− Cj
Cj
))
for some suitably small value of ∆, with a similar
expression for µPj (t+∆). The congestion prices are
thus adjusted every ∆ seconds so that the resource
usage at each node converges towards being utilised
as much as is possible without exceeding the target
resource usage at each node.
2.5. The route prices
Once the prices of the resources at the nodes are
known, the price for sending a unit of flow along a
particular route can be determined.
Let etxij denote the power used to transmit a unit
flow from node i to node j in the absence of radio
interference. We assume that etxij is an increasing
function of the distance between the positions zi, zj
of nodes i and j, and also there is a certain minimum
power needed irrespective of the positions [10]. We
therefore choose
etxij = max(10
−2, 10−4||zi − zj ||
2
2)
which is a non-zero function in the vicinity of the
transmitting node i. If node i cannot reach node j
then we set etxij =∞. Crowcroft et al. [2] specify
etxij = 10
−4||zi − zj ||
1/2
2 . Let e
rx denote the power
used to receive a unit flow.
The price µrj(t) that node j charges the originat-
ing node O(r) of route r for processing a unit of flow
along route r is computed as follows. If node j is
the originating node of route r then bandwidth and
power resources are used at node j for transmitting
to node k where k = fr(j) so that
µrj(t) =
etxjk
P (σrj)
µPj (t) +
1
P (σrj)
µBj (t).
If node j is a transit node of route r then bandwidth
and power resources are used at node j for receiving
from the node preceding node j and for transmitting
to node k where k = fr(j) so that
µrj(t)
=
(
erx +
etxjk
P (σrj)
)
µPj (t) +
(
1 +
1
P (σrj)
)
µBj (t).
If node j is the destination node of route r then
bandwidth and power resources are used at node j
for receiving from the node preceding node j so that
µrj(t) = e
rxµPj (t) + µ
B
j (t).
The congestion prices of the resources consumed in
transmission are inflated by a factor 1/P (σrj) to
model the resources consumed by the transmission
of errored packets. It is assumed that only correct
packets are received.
2.6. The credit balance
The nodes are given an incentive to provide re-
sources for forwarding transit traffic and for receiv-
ing traffic: by doing so they earn credits which they
in turn require to send their own data. In this sub-
section we describe how the credit balance evolves
as a function of time.
Each node s maintains a credit balance bs(t) with
an initial value of 1. The credit balances are mod-
elled as continuous variables. The credit balance of
node s is adjusted according to the following three
principles
(i) The node s spends credits
∑
r∈RS(s) yr(t)µr(t)
for the congestion costs (bandwidth, power)
incurred in transmitting its own traffic
through the source, transit and destination
nodes on its outbound routes, where µr(t) is
the sum of the prices charged by the nodes
along route r
µr(t) =
∑
j∈r
µrj(t). (4)
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(ii) The node s receives credits
∑
r:s∈r yr(t)µrs(t)
for the congestion costs (bandwidth, power)
incurred in acting as a source node, transit
node, or a destination node. Note that the
route prices also include the costs incurred at
the originating node. These costs do not cause
credits to be transferred since the originating
node pays itself, reflecting the fact that the re-
sources at the originating node may be scarce.
(iii) For each node s, that part of the credit bal-
ance that differs from the average value of 1
is discounted using a factor β = 0.01 (say)
where β has dimension seconds−1. Thus over
one second, the under-provisioned nodes that
possess a credit balance of less than 1 receive
1% of the credits that they lack and the over-
provisioned nodes that possess a credit bal-
ance larger than 1 surrender 1% of that part
of their balance that exceeds 1.
Note that credit discounting allows under-
provisioned nodes to increase their credit balance
at the expense of over-provisioned nodes. In prac-
tice, credit discounting should be organized such
that it does not undermine the incentive system
which encourages over-provisioned nodes to make
their resources available to the network. This can be
achieved by monetarily charging under-provisioned
nodes for creating credit, such charges being ac-
cumulated in a fund which is used to monetarily
compensate over-provisioned nodes for destroying
credit. This type of monetary compensation is dis-
cussed in Section 3.5.
We now present a DE for bs(t) which satisfies the
three principles mentioned above
d
dt
bs(t) =−β(bs(t)− 1) + Ωs(t) (5)
where the reimbursement
Ωs(t) =
∑
r:s∈r
yr(t)µrs(t)−
∑
r∈RS(s)
yr(t)µr(t). (6)
With this definition, the credit balance bs(t) is af-
fected by credit discounting (the term −β(bs(t)−1)
which increases or decreases the credit balance at
node s depending on whether the node s is under- or
over-provisioned) and by the reimbursement Ωs(t)
which represents the credits earned by by node s by
forwarding traffic from other nodes as well as the
credits spent by node s in transmitting it’s own traf-
fic.
The DE (5) can be approximately evaluated
through
bs(t+∆) ≈ bs(t)− β∆(bs(t)− 1) + ∆Ωs(t). (7)
In the remainder of this paper the term “reimburse-
ment” refers to credit allocation via Ωs(t) defined
in Eqn. (6) and the term “redistribution” refers to
credit allocation via β∆(bs(t) − 1) as in Eqn. (7).
Note that the credits transferred via Eqns. (6)
and (7) take place not necessarily in integral units.
If the credits earned are equal to the credits spent
so that
∑
sΩs(t) = 0, then the total credit balance
is equal to the number of nodes N . This can readily
be shown by induction over t. Recall that bs(0) = 1
for all s so that
∑
s bs(0) = N . Next suppose that∑
s bs(t) = N . Then∑
s
bs(t+∆)
=
∑
s
bs(t)− β∆
∑
s
(bs(t)− 1) + ∆
∑
s
Ωs(t)
=
∑
s
bs(t) = N
which completes the proof.
Note that in [2], the term
∑
r∈RS(s) yr(t)µr(t) in
Eqn. (6) which denotes the credits spent by node s in
transmitting its own traffic along route r, is replaced
by αsbs(t) where 0 < αs ≤ 1 so that the credit
balance satisfies the DE
d
dt
bs(t)
=−β(bs(t)− 1)− αsbs(t) +
∑
r:s∈r
yr(t)µrs(t). (8)
However, when radio interference (Section 2.3)
and autonomous motion (Section 4) are modelled,
Eqn. (8) is no longer valid. For example, if at least
one node has moved, then Eqn. (8) describes the
change incurred in the credits received namely∑
r:s∈r yr(t)µrs(t) yet Eqn. (8) assumes that the
credits spent remain what they were before node s
moved, namely αsbs(t). The incorrect computation
of the amount of credits spent has two consequences.
First, the total credit balance in the network is no
longer constant, and second, credit balance optimi-
sation will maximize the credits received but not
the credits spent.
2.7. The willingness-to-pay
Each node s determines its resource usage accord-
ing to its willingness-to-pay ws(t) at time t for the
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congestion costs incurred in sending its traffic. The
willingness-to-pay ws(t) has dimension seconds
−1.
As in [2], we assume that the willingness-to-pay
is a fixed share of the total credits available so that
ws(t) = αsbs(t) where 0 < αs ≤ 1/∆. Observe that
αs > 1 is feasible. The credit spent by node s for
transmitting data over an interval of time ∆ is thus
αsbs(t)∆. The maximum value αs = 1/∆ represents
the extreme case where all credits available are spent
during a time slice ∆.
2.8. Flow allocation
A call between an originating node and a destina-
tion node is connected on the least cost route con-
necting these two nodes. Once the route prices are
known, the least cost route can be determined. This
is done as follows.
A call originating at node s at time t is connected
to a randomly selected destination node d along the
least cost route r⋆ where
r⋆ = arg min
r∈RS(s)
D(r)=d
∑
j∈r
µrj(t). (9)
The routes are assigned unique labels and are lexico-
graphically sorted according to a collation sequence:
ties in Eqn. (9) are resolved lexicographically.
The total flow xs(t) generated by node s at time t,
assuming that the willingness-to-payws(t) is equally
distributed among theNs(t) > 0 calls originating at
node s at time t, is
xs(t) =
∑
r∈RS(s)
yr(t) =
1
Ns(t)
∑
r⋆∈RS(s)
ws(t)
µr⋆(t)
(10)
where yr(t) > 0 only on those routes r
⋆ that attain
a minimum in Eqn. (9).
Note that the route flows yr(t) at time t are no
longer decision variables to be determined directly.
Instead, as we see from Eqn. (10), the total flows
xs(t) are derived from the prices µrj(t) that them-
selves depend on the congestion price decision vari-
ables µPj (t) and µ
B
j (t) which are obtained as solu-
tions to Eqns. (2) and (3).
2.9. The bandwidth and power usage
Once the routes used by the calls in service are
known, the sets of routes RS(j), RD(j) and RT (j)
which originate, terminate and transit node j can
be updated. The bandwidth cj(t) used at node j at
time t is given by
cj(t) =
∑
r∈RS(j)
yr(t)
P (σrj)
+
∑
r∈RD(j)
yr(t)
+
∑
r∈RT (j):j∈r
(
1 +
1
P (σrj)
)
yr(t). (11)
Note that the transmitted flows are inflated by a fac-
tor 1/P (σrj). It is assumed that no packets are lost
when the flow is received. The factor 1 + 1/P (σrj)
(which is larger than 2) accounts for the fact that at
any transit node along the route, the flow has to be
both received and forwarded.
The power γj(t) used at node j at time t is given
by
γj(t) =
∑
r∈RS(j)
etxjk
P (σrj)
yr(t) +
∑
r∈RD(j)
yr(t)e
rx
+
∑
r∈RT (j):j∈r
(
erx +
etxjk
P (σrj)
)
yr(t) (12)
where k = fr(j). As was the case for the bandwidth
usage, the power usage relates to gross rates, and
therefore the outgoing flows are inflated.
The numerical evaluation of Eqn. (10) can yield
flow values yr(t) which, when used in Eqns. (11) and
(12), cause the total bandwidth cj(t) and the total
power γj(t) to differ from their target usage values of
Cj and Γj respectively. However, the model ensures
that the total bandwidth in use and the total power
in use at each node converge towards values that
do not exceed the target values. The rate at which
the resource usages converge towards their target
usages depends upon the time interval ∆ between
successive evaluations of the DE s which determine
the congestion prices and the credit balances at the
nodes. The interval ∆ should be chosen sufficiently
small such that the discrete approximations to the
DE’s (2), (3) and (5) provide accurate solutions. Fol-
lowing [2] we use ∆ = 0.01 seconds.
2.10. The simulation model
The simulator uses the equations described in Sec-
tions 2.3 through 2.9 above. The simulation pro-
ceeds as a sequence of steps. In each step, for those
nodes which currently originate calls, the simula-
tor computes the node prices, which determine the
route prices; the credit balances are updated and
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the willingness-to-spend is computed; the new flow
allocations are computed; the resources in use are
computed, and the next simulation step begins. Ad-
ditional updates take place when calls enter or leave
the simulated network.
We developed the simulator in Java using the
DESMO-J simulation framework [12]. The simula-
tion model computes Eqns. (1) through (12) and is
parametrised as follows:
– each node originates one call at a time so that
Ns(t) = 1
– each call selects a destination node at random
· the call is connected on the route with the lowest
(at the instant of the call initiation) costs
· the route is used for the duration of the call: calls
are not rerouted, which implies low signalling
costs and no route flap
– the call holding times and the call idle times are
exponentially distributed, mean 0.5 seconds
– the prices are updated every ∆ = 0.01 seconds
– the simulation lasts for 100,000 seconds.
Note that the order in which Eqns. (1) through (12)
are presented corresponds to the order in which
these quantities are computed every ∆ seconds in
the simulator.
2.11. Implementation issues
A protocol to implement the incentive-based con-
trol was presented in [13]. In this regard we observe
that the parameter values required for the calcula-
tion of Eqns. (1) through (12), apart from Eqn. (4),
are local in the sense that any quantity computed
for node i is expressed in terms of the parameters of
node i and its neighbours j = fr(i).
The calculation of Eqn. (4) requires access to non-
local information. However, Eqn. (4) can be evalu-
ated if a distance vector routing protocol is used to
communicate at regular intervals to each node an es-
timate of the route costs from each of its neighbours
to all destinations.
A practical implementation would also require the
average call holding time 1/µ to be of the order of
several minutes so that the calculation of the con-
gestion prices, flows and resources consumed would
occur relatively infrequently at intervals of O(∆/µ)
and would therefore place a small computational
burden on the nodes.
3. Credit redistribution
According to the credit reimbursement scheme
proposed in [2], nodes acquire credits by providing
resources to relay calls from other nodes. The nodes
then use their credits to pay for the cost of sending
their own traffic. Such a protocol ensures mutual co-
operation. One consequence of this mutual cooper-
ation is that nodes at the edge of the network which
attract little transit traffic will earn few credits from
transporting transit calls. The data rates for traf-
fic originating from such nodes will be low. Nodes
at the centre of the network will attract a relatively
large amount of transit traffic and will earn credits
from transporting transit calls. The data rates for
traffic originating from such nodes will be larger.
However, one or more nodes may need to increase
their data rate(s) beyond that afforded by the re-
sources that its current credit balance allows it to
acquire. This might in particular hold for nodes lo-
cated at the periphery of the network that attract
only a limited number of transit calls and thus
have a limited credit balance. Such nodes, though
relatively isolated from the rest of the network,
may have urgent data to transmit and they should
be allowed to send their data at a rate such that
their data transmissions complete in their allotted
time. Credit reimbursement as given by Eqn. (6)
is therefore augmented [2] by a mechanism for re-
distributing credits from those nodes that are over-
provisioned with an above-average bs(t) > 1 amount
of credits to those nodes that are under-provisioned
with a below-average bs(t) < 1 amount of credits.
The following sections investigate various meth-
ods for improving the credit redistribution mech-
anism. We distinguish between the global redistri-
bution of credits from all nodes with bs(t) > 1 to
all nodes with bs(t) < 1, and the local redistribu-
tion of credits where an under-provisioned node with
bs(t) < 1 receives credits from one or more of its
neighbouring nodes that are over-provisioned.
Note that any credit redistribution, be it global or
local, requires a mechanism that compensates those
nodes that surrender their credits for the benefit
of others, and penalizes those nodes that replenish
their credits at the expense of others. If this were
not done then well-provisioned nodes, for example,
would lack an incentive not to spent all their credits
before their credits were removed by redistribution:
see the discussions in Section 2.6 and Section 3.5.
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3.1. The original global credit redistribution model
In this section we examine credit redistribution as
presented in [2] but modified via Eqn. (6) to take the
effect of motion and radio interference into account.
Consider Eqn. (7) which is used to compute the
credit balance every∆ seconds. The termβ(bs(t)−1)
in Eqns. (5) and (7) models the global redistribution
of credits at node s. If bs(t) exceeds the average value
of the node credit balance (the average value is 1),
then the credit balance at node s will be decreased
by an amount that is proportional to that part of the
credit balance that exceeds 1. This is interpreted as
a transfer (redistribution) of credits from node s to
other nodes. Similarly, if bs(t) is less than 1, then the
credit balance at node s will be increased, which we
interpret as a transfer (redistribution) of credits to
node s from other nodes. Credit redistribution thus
allows a node to acquire/release credits in addition
to those credits that were earned/spent via the re-
imbursement mechanism.
This approach towards global redistribution
does scale even though an increase/decrease in the
credit balance of one node corresponds to an de-
crease/increase in the credit balances of one or more
nodes that are possibly located in a distant part of
the network. No mechanism is required to transfer
the redistributed credit. A node that has a surplus
of credits will, over a period of time ∆, destroy a
fraction β of that surplus. Likewise a node that has
an under-supply of credits will, over a period of
time ∆, create credits corresponding to a β fraction
of its deficit.
Note that for β > 0, the credit balance at each
node s is bounded below by bs(t) ≥ β/(α+β) where
α = αs for all node indices s. This positive minimum
credit balance is realised when a node s earns no
transit revenue, in which case the reimbursement
becomes
Ωs(t) = −
∑
r∈RS(s)
yr(t)µr(t) = −αbs(t)
since yr(t) = αbs(t)/µr(t). In general, when a node s
earns transit revenue, we have Ωs(t) ≥ −αbs(t). If
the reimbursement Ωs(t) is equal to the credit bal-
ance redistributed β(bs(t) − 1) then β(bs(t) − 1) ≥
−αbs(t) so that bs(t) ≥ β/(α+ β).
Global redistribution thus ensures that a mini-
mum amount of credits is available at each node, in-
cluding those nodes at the edge of the network that
are unable to attract transit traffic. Global redistri-
bution also ensures that credits cannot be perma-
nently accumulated by nodes that are well-off. This
can be interpreted as the credits expiring at each
node s in the sense that using resources at other
nodes along routes r ∈ RS(s) in return for services
granted to the routes that transit node s cannot be
postponed indefinitely. The total credit balance of
all the nodes in the network remains equal to the
number of nodes in the network even if nodes leave
the network (in general the credit balance of a de-
parting node is not equal to 1) and/or if nodes enter
the network with an arbitrary initial credit endow-
ment.
We now investigate three value-ranges for β.
• β = 0 implies that credits are allocated by re-
imbursement and no credit redistribution takes
place. In this case Eqn. (7) yields
bs(t+∆) = bs(t) + ∆Ωs(t) (13)
and the nodes acquire credits only by providing
resources to relay the calls from other nodes.
• 0 < β < 1/∆ implies that credits are allocated
both by reimbursement and by credit redistribu-
tion. Thus [2] suggests to discount that part of the
credit balance that differs from 1 using β = 0.01,
so that over one second, under-provisioned nodes
receive 1% of the credits that they lack in compar-
ison to an average node’s credit balance (a balance
of 1), see Eqn. (7). Correspondingly, nodes that
possess a credit balance larger than 1 surrender
1% of that part of their balance that exceeds 1.
Increasing the value of β increases the amount
of the credit balance discounted, so that the value
(1 − β∆)bs(t) of the credits earned in the past
becomes less important. This decreases the rela-
tive importance of the reimbursement scheme over
credit redistribution, since the advantageous (dis-
advantageous) treatment of nodes that in the past
have allocated a high (low) share of their resources
to other nodes’ calls is further reduced due to the
increasing amount of credits being transferred by
redistribution.
• β = 1/∆ implies that credits are allocated pri-
marily by redistribution and almost no reimburse-
ment takes place. In this case Eqn. (7) yields
bs(t+∆) = 1 +∆Ωs(t)
so that the credit allocation becomes “memory-
less”. The credit balance available for spending
during the next period depends on what was
earned/paid during the current period: any credit
10
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Fig. 2. Global redistribution [2] versus β.
balance history preceding the current period is
irrelevant. Note that for ∆ sufficiently small, the
credit balance bs(t+∆) = 1+∆Ωs(t) ≈ 1 closely
approximates the case where the credit balance
at each node is reset to 1 at the start of each
update period.
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between the value of β
and the average credit balance and the data trans-
mission rates of four nodes in the 10-node network
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
N0
N1
N2
N3N4
N5
N6
N7
N8
N9
Fig. 3. The geographic topology of the 10-node network [2].
presented in Fig. 3. The simulation executes for
100,000 time units during which more than 700,000
calls arrive to the network model. The congestion
prices are adjusted every ∆ = 0.01 seconds.
As β increases, the credit balance at each node
converges towards 1. This does not imply that the
data rates of the originating traffic at all the nodes
become identical. A node in a central position like
node 8 is closer to an average destination node than
a node at the periphery like node 1. This yields a
lower cost per unit flow at node 8 due to the rela-
tively lower cost of carrying calls on shorter routes.
In addition, nodes with one or more nodes in close
proximity (like node 7) benefit from an increased
credit balance to a higher degree than the average
under-provisioned node since the data rates of such
short distance calls are disproportionately highly in-
creased. Thus node 7 is able to relatively cheaply
increase its (average) data rate of originating calls.
However, increasing the value of β yields only a small
improvement in the data rate at node 1.
The lower plot of Fig. 2 shows that β ≈ 0.1
yields the highest average total data rate of 27.6
units/second. Thus throughput maximisation re-
quires (slightly) increasing the flow allocation
model’s emphasis on reimbursement by reducing
the value (1 − β∆)bs(t) of the credits earned in the
past.
3.2. A modified global credit redistribution model
The above experiments significantly change the
credit and the resource allocation (for large values
of β) yet the data rate at node 1 is increased only
slightly and remains significantly smaller than the
data rates at the other nodes.
This raises the question as to whether it is possi-
ble to either further improve the data rate at node
1 by increasing the discount factor of node 1 while
leaving the discount factors of the other nodes un-
changed, or to at least achieve similar results in
terms of the data rate at node 1 by less drastic
changes to the credit and resource allocation. The
following approaches were investigated.
Adjusting the discount factor at node 1. Here the
discount factor β of all the nodes remains fixed at
the default value 0.01 apart from node 1 where β is
varied in the range 0.01 ≤ β ≤ 1/∆. In this case,
the nodes earning credits do not lose the amount
gained as quickly as in the experiments presented
in Section 3.1 above (these nodes now have a con-
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Fig. 4. Global redistribution versus β of node 1.
stant β-value of 0.01 so that credits are allocated
primarily by reimbursement) yet the credit balance
at the under-provisioned node 1 (this node now has
a larger β-value) is replenished as rapidly as in the
experiments above.
Note that this update policy violates the model’s
property that the total credit balance remains equal
to the number of nodes in the network: the amounts
by which discounting increases or decreases the
credit balances are no longer necessarily zero-sum.
The increase in the total credit balance can be
regarded as “inflation”: the increased amount of
credits lowers the value of the credits.
Fig. 4 shows that in comparison to the original ex-
periment, the central nodes 0 and 8 are now better
off; under-provisioned peripheral nodes like node 7
no longer benefit from an increased β at the ex-
pense of central nodes. However, the data rate at
node 1 remains more or less the same as before:
node 1 spends its credits to pay its relay nodes (pro-
vided these credits are no longer quickly removed by
a high β). Inflation increases the congestion prices
since more credits are available in total, with the un-
desirable result that the increased amount of cred-
its that node 1 possesses cannot be used to acquire
additional resources.
Adjusting the target credit balance at node 1. In
order to permanently increase the credits available
to node 1, we introduce a target credit balance ks
for each node s such that the target balance is not
necessarily equal to 1. Eqns. (5) and (7) become
dbs(t)
dt
= −β(bs(t)− ks) + Ωs(t)
and
bs(t+∆)= bs(t) + ∆Ωs(t)− β∆(bs(t)− ks).
This approach leaves the total credit balance
∑
s ks
constant and so avoids inflation. Fig. 5 shows the
results for
ks =

 2 s = 11 otherwise
which doubles the target credit balance at node 1.
Fig. 5 shows a limited improvement in the data
rate at node 1, especially if β is set sufficiently large
that the credit balance at node 1 reaches a value
close to 2. The reasons for the modest improvement
in the data rate at node 1 are the increased call
traffic demand (yielding increased congestion prices,
so that doubling the value of the willingness-to-pay
does not result in twice the resources being allocated
to a call), and the overall resource restrictions. Since
all the nodes adjacent to node 1 are relatively far
away, call traffic is limited by the power available
– another experiment using k1 = 10 yielded only a
minor increase in resources allocated.
Further suggestions. The willingness-to-pay ws(t)
is given by ws(t) = αsbs(t). We have not investi-
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Fig. 5. Global redistribution with the target credit balance
of node 1 set to 2.
gated the effect of modifying the value of the αs of
a subset of the nodes. We do not expect that chang-
ing the value of αs will yield significantly different
results than in the last experiment (which yielded
the highest data rate possible for node 1) since the
central idea of both attempts is to linearly scale the
willingness-to-pay at node 1 – whether this is done
by doubling the credits available or by doubling the
share of the (not doubled) amount of credits should
yield similar results.
Finally, it is also possible to continuously transfer
a fixed amount of credits to node 1. This approach
was not investigated since constant credit transfers
do not adapt to the current state of node 1 and of the
network in general. Thus node 1 could potentially
accumulate a large amount of credits if no call is in
service for a while, and this would cause inflation if
the nodes which contribute credit to node 1 are not
identified.
3.3. Local credit redistribution
Local credit redistribution limits the under-
provisioned nodes to acquiring credits from nodes
within their transmission range only. For the pur-
pose of credit balance updates, β in Eqn. (7) is set
to zero, again yielding Eqn. (13) where global credit
redistribution is disabled. However, once the credit
balance of a node s drops below a given threshold
0 < b < 1, the surplus credits (a node is deemed
to have a surplus of credits if its credit balance
exceeds 1) of an adjacent node (or more than one
node, if need be) are transferred to node s until
either node s reaches a credit balance of 1, or no
adjacent node disposes of a surplus. For any node
this yields a “social cluster” (defined by adjacency)
of nodes that can provide credits as the need arises.
In a typical (connected) network, these social clus-
ters are not disjoint, so that the credits transferred
to an adjacent node might be further transferred to
more distant nodes in the event that the first re-
ceiver is able to build up a surplus of credits. How-
ever, successive credit transfers eventually yielding
a dispersion of credits throughout the network are
unlikely. A node that is under-provisioned due to
its disadvantageous location will typically, yet not
necessarily, spend its (locally transferred) credits
for call transmission and will soon become under-
provisioned again; thus the node is unable to further
transfer the credits received to other nodes. This
mechanism of local redistribution scales since only
adjacent nodes need communicate in the event of a
shortage of credits.
Since nodes may be forced to surrender a signifi-
cant share of their credit balance, the concept of mu-
tual cooperation is relaxed. A node that is repeat-
edly forced to surrender a large portion of its surplus
credits to its under-provisioned neighbours cannot
attain a high data rate for its originated calls. We
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Fig. 6. Local redistribution versus the credit threshold b.
therefore impose a weaker definition of mutual co-
operation which preserves the order in which the ad-
jacent nodes are forced to release their surplus cred-
its. Each attempt to acquire credits will commence
at the last node that was not required to completely
release its surplus. Therefore any node will not have
to surrender its entire surplus twice in succession
unless all the other neighbours did the same. More-
over, the order in which all the nodes (that poten-
tially compete for the surplus from the same nodes)
scan their credit balance and initiate local credit re-
distribution if need be is randomised at each update
interval ∆: thus no node has the advantage of always
acquiring credits first.
Similar to Fig. 2, Fig. 6 shows the effect of different
values of the credit threshold b on the average credit
balance and the data transmission rate at the same
four nodes. The figure shows that the effects of local
and global credit redistribution are approximately
the same. As b increases, the average credit balance
converges towards 1, which improves the data rates
of the previously under-provisioned nodes at the ex-
pense of the over-provisioned neighbours. Due to the
influence of the topology (the distance to the neigh-
bouring nodes, the average distance to all nodes) on
the price a node has to pay for originating calls, the
data rates do not converge.
The experiment indicates that the total flow is
robust with respect to the choice of b: for b ≥ 0.5
the total flow is almost constant, with the greatest
total flow (27.4 units/second) obtained at b = 0.7.
Note that credit redistribution allows any node
to (temporarily) increase its data rate. Such an ap-
proach is not restricted to nodes with small data
rates: credits can be locally redistributed so that a
well-provisioned node that has a pressing need to
transmit as quickly as possible can be provided with
even more credits. However, local credit redistribu-
tion is most likely to have a significant impact on
data rates when applied to under-provisioned nodes
since the willingness to pay of a well-provisioned
node might already dominate any other demand for
resources: the well-provisioned node may already be
receiving (almost) all the resources available.
3.4. A comparison of global versus local
redistribution
The experiments show that from both the view-
points of enabling peripheral nodes to send call traf-
fic as well as the total network data rate maximi-
sation (subject to highest possible resource utilisa-
tion) it is beneficial to augment the reimbursement
scheme with the additional mechanism of global or
local credit redistribution.
Global redistribution as suggested by [2], using a
value of β = 0.01, provides a reasonable trade-off
between reimbursement whereby a node is compen-
sated for making its resources available to the com-
munity, and redistribution which allows an under-
provisioned node to transmit traffic.
Credit redistribution enables higher total data
rates. Thus redistribution serves another purpose
in addition to the purpose intended by the authors
of [2] who proposed redistribution as a mechanism
for keeping the total amount of credits equal to the
number of nodes in the network in the event of nodes
entering and/or leaving the network.
For the network model under investigation, global
redistribution yields slightly better total data rates
than local redistribution. Global redistribution
should thus be preferred unless it is necessary to
identify pairs of nodes involved in any credit trans-
fer, for example to enable nodes to monetarily
compensate each other for credits moved, which
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would imply centralised control in the case of global
redistribution. Preliminary experiments with both
global and local redistribution enabled yielded no
significant improvement in comparison to conduct-
ing global redistribution only.
The inferior performance of local redistribution
is due to the fact that an under-provisioned node
must acquire credits from nodes with a credit sur-
plus within its connectivity range only. This restric-
tion might even cause local redistribution to fail in
network topologies where under-provisioned nodes
are locally clustered. Such nodes will not be able to
locally acquire bandwidth while the surplus credit
balance of nodes clustered at the centre (adjacent
to other nodes that are able to build up a surplus
only) cannot be acquired.
In the 10-node network topology, node 8 (that
has the highest credit surplus) as well as node 5
and node 0 are located within range of the periph-
eral node 1, while node 9 cannot be reached from
node 1. Therefore node 5, although originally build-
ing up a higher surplus than node 9, has to transfer
credits to node 1 and is thus worse-off than node 9.
Therefore node 9 benefits from the under-provision
of credits at node 1 when competing with node 5 for
the same resources such as using node 8 as transit
node. This can be explained as follows. Since node 5
has to transfer credits to node 1, its credit balance is
diminished. Node 5 has a correspondingly low data
rate and receives a correspondingly low resource al-
location from the transit node 8. This yields a higher
resource allocation to other nodes at node 8, which
benefits node 9 and the data rate at node 9 improves.
Regardless of what the data rate at node 9 was be-
fore, now that node 5 has fewer credits to spend, the
data rate at node 9 increases.
Global redistribution avoids such a biased treat-
ment (biased in the sense that local redistribution
penalises well-provisioned nodes that are adjacent
to under-provisioned nodes) since the share of the
surplus credit removed is the same for all nodes able
to obtain a surplus. Global redistribution will min-
imise perturbations to the competition among nodes
with surplus credits.
3.5. Cooperative behaviour and compensation
The issue of trust is not addressed in this paper.
In this regard, a security mechanism such as in [14]
is needed to ensure that nodes cannot create credits
without corresponding monetary payments which
accrue to a fund. Likewise nodes that destroy cred-
its are monetarily compensated from the fund.
The scheme is stable. Assume for example that
all nodes increase their credit balances simultane-
ously. All nodes contribute to the fund in return for
the creation of credits. Since the credit balances at
all the nodes increase, no node will receive a signif-
icant better (or worse) service: each node’s willing-
ness to pay increases and so do the resource prices,
so that no node can significantly improve its data
rate. Over time, global redistribution will slowly re-
move the credits that every node possesses in excess
of the target credit balance so that the credit bal-
ances converge towards the level that prevailed be-
fore each node increased its balance.
If monetary compensation is used, then when ini-
tially increasing their credit balances the nodes con-
tribute to the fund in return for the creation of cred-
its. Conversely, as credits are removed from the sys-
tem due to global redistribution, the nodes are com-
pensated from the fund, which yields zero-sum over-
all payments.
A node may attempt to create more credits
(cheat) by increasing its credit balance bs(t) at
some discrete time instants t. In addition, an under-
provisioned node can accelerate global credit redis-
tribution by continuously applying a node-specific
discount factor βj larger than β; likewise an over-
provisioned node may increase its credit balance
by using a discount factor smaller than β to delay
redistribution. Note that such behaviour will cause
the total credit balance to no longer be equal to the
number of nodes.
Such an increase in the total credit balance can be
regarded as inflation: the increased amount of cred-
its lowers the value of the credit. However, if all the
nodes increase their balance bs(t) by applying the
same increased discount factor β, the prices will be
higher, yet each node will receive the same amount
of resources, which corresponds to inflation. Even-
tually the total amount of credits in the system (and
thus the prices) decreases due to global redistribu-
tion and the total balance converges to the num-
ber of nodes. To receive preferential treatment when
competing with other nodes for access to resources,
a node must be the only cheat, or cheat by a signifi-
cantly larger margin than all its competitors. Cheat-
ing must be repeated continuously for a node to re-
ceive a permanent advantage over other nodes. Lo-
cal redistribution can be viewed as a form of cheat-
ing. In this case, inflation is avoided since credits
are moved, not created, so that the total amount of
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credits in the network remains constant.
Note that both local and global credit redistribu-
tion require some form of compensation to provide
an incentive for over-provisioned nodes to take part
in the network. This compensation can take the form
of monetary payments.
Monetary payments could be conducted as fol-
lows: credits transferred among the nodes in return
for relaying calls require no monetary compensa-
tion. Recall that the target credit balance of a node
is 1. Nodes which have a credit balance less than 1
and which are therefore under-supplied with credits
can be charged a monetary amount when they cre-
ate credits through the application of Eqn. (5). The
money raised in this way is used to compensate those
nodes which have a credit balance greater than 1
and which are therefore over-supplied with credits:
these nodes destroy credits through the application
of Eqn. (5). Since the creation/destruction of credits
increases/decreases a node’s expected service, such
a monetary compensation presents an incentive for
a node with a balance above 1 (such nodes provide
more resources to the community than they remove
from the community) to take part in the network.
The same argument in favour of monetary com-
pensation also applies when local redistribution is
used to move credits from over-provisioned to under-
provisioned nodes.
4. Autonomous motion
Some nodes may be placed so that they do not
attract transit flows. These nodes earn revenue only
from sending and receiving traffic and so they have
little credit for sending their own traffic. One could
argue that these nodes must be content with a low
data rate, but on the other hand these nodes could
move to more favourable positions where they could
earn revenue and so improve their data rate. We call
this “autonomous motion”. Here radio interference
plays an important role, as it defines an interesting
trade-off: nodes may prefer to be close together in
order to reduce the power needed to transmit data,
but on the other hand proximity increases radio in-
terference, and has therefore a negative effect on
connectivity. In the remainder of the paper we will
obtain insight into the resulting behaviour by means
of simulation experiments which reveal that the po-
sitions of the nodes converge to non-trivial optimal
positions on 2D and 3D surfaces.
4.1. The motion model
The location of the nodes determines (i) the bat-
tery power etxij required to transmit unit flows, and
(ii) the signal-to-interference ratios σri. These quan-
tities in turn will have an impact on the congestion
costs which determine the routes and the flows. In
this initial study, the costs of the energy expended
in the motion are not taken into account.
The autonomous motion of the nodes is modelled
as follows. We assume that each node can estimate
its own position. At intervals of 100∆ seconds, each
node broadcasts its position and the magnitudes of
its originating and transit flows to its neighbours.
These data allow each node to compute, at intervals
of 100∆ seconds, an approximate value of its utility
function ui,n(t + ∆) that would be realised if the
node moved from its current position (xi(t), yi(t))
to any of N candidate positions
(xi(t) + x˙i∆cos(2πn/N), yi(t) + y˙i∆sin(2πn/N))
where (x˙i, y˙i) is the (fixed) velocity of node i, and
n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The best move for node i
(the value of n that maximises the utility ui,n(t +
∆), say n⋆) is determined. Node i will not move if
ui,n⋆(t + ∆) ≤ ui(t). First each node determines
its optimal direction, and only then do they move
(simultaneously). The accuracy with which node i
can compute its utility function depends upon the
extent to which its estimates of the positions and the
flows of its neighbours are both accurate and up-to-
date, and the computational resources available to
node i.
Note that the nodes do not move to the candidate
positions to measure the values of the utility; each
node remains in its current position while it com-
putes an estimate of its utility function at each of
the candidate positions.
If a node is out of transmission range and can-
not reach any other node, then such a disconnected
node will move at random until it can reach a node
whereupon it will move autonomously as described
above.
4.2. Experimental results
We next present the results of a set of experiments
that allow the nodes to move autonomously in or-
der to maximise their utility functions, as described
below. As mentioned earlier, there is an interest-
ing trade-off between the nodes being close together
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Fig. 7. A 3-node network: the nodes move autonomously in
order to maximise their credit balances.
(thus reducing the transmission power needed) and
being far apart (thus reducing the radio interfer-
ence). The experiments indicate how the nodesmove
in specific situations.
We consider two utility functions namely ui(t) =
bi(t) so that the utility at node i is equal to the credit
balance at node i, and ui(t) =
∑
r∈RS(i) yr(t) where
i = O(r) where O(r) denotes the originating node
of route r so that the utility at node i is equal to the
total flow originating at node i.
A 3-node network. In this experiment three nodes
are located on a 100m×100mplane: the three nodes
lie almost on a North-South straight line. Node 0
moves from North to South. Radio interference is
included in the model.
Fig. 7 shows that nodes 1 and 2 display interesting
(but expected) behaviours as they move in order to
maximise their credit balances. First consider node 1.
As node 0 approaches node 1, node 1 moves South,
away from node 0. When node 0 is near node 1,
node 1 movesWest, away from node 0. When node 0
is distant from node 1, node 1 is immobile.
Next consider node 2.When node 0 is distant from
node 2, node 2 is immobile. As node 0 approaches
node 2, node 2 moves South, away from node 0.
When node 0 is near node 2, node 2 moves East,
away from node 0. When node 0 moves past node 2,
node 2movesNorth, away fromnode 0.When node 0
is distant from node 2, node 2 moves South, away
from node 1.
A 21-node network. In this experiment 21 nodes
are located on a 100m× 100m plane in three con-
centric rings surrounding a central node. Radio
interference is included in the model. Fig. 8(upper)
shows what happens when the nodes move au-
tonomously to maximise their credit balances. The
nodes located on the outer ring move to the edge of
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
time
x
y
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
time
x
y
Fig. 8. A 21-node network: the nodes move autonomously in
order to maximise their credit balances (upper); throughputs
(lower).
the network. The other nodes remain more or less
in place. Fig. 8(lower) shows what happens when
the nodes move autonomously to maximise their
throughputs. The nodes move towards the centre
of the network where they form an approximate
ring, yielding an increase of some 25% in the total
average throughput due to the shorter transmission
distances even though the radio interference among
the nodes has increased.
A 10-node network: a collective motion is induced.
In this experiment 10 nodes are located at random
on a 100m× 100m plane as in Fig. 3. Radio inter-
ference is included in the model. Node 1 moves at
a constant velocity from its initial location close to
the South-East edge of the network through the cen-
troid of the network and reaches the North bound-
ary of the network at the end of the simulation.
Fig. 9 shows what happens when the nodes move
autonomously to maximise their throughputs. The
nodes initially move towards the centre of the net-
work. As node 1 approaches the centroid of the net-
work, the remaining nodes move in a cluster to in-
tercept node 1. Having intercepted node 1, the clus-
ter tracks the motion of node 1 but remains at a
distance from node 1: the nodes in the cluster align
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Fig. 9. A 10-node network: the nodes move autonomously in
order to maximise their throughputs; a collective motion is
induced by the deterministic motion of node 1.
themselves along an approximately co-linear front,
which configuration affords energy efficient multi-
hop connectivity among the nodes in the cluster.
A 10-node network: motion on a 3D surface. Con-
sider the surface
z = f(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
aie
−((x−xi)
2+(y−yi)
2)/si
which places a hill i centred on (xi, yi) where ai de-
notes the scale (height) and si the shape (steepness)
of the hill.
In this experiment we construct N = 2 hills lo-
cated on a 100m×100mplane. The hills are centred
on (x1, y1) = (20, 80) and (x2, y2) = (70, 30) and
are of height a1 = 10, a2 = 5 and shape s1 = s2 =
100. Radio interference is included in themodel. The
nodes are placed at random on the (x, y)-plane as in
Fig. 3 except for nodes 1 and 4 which are initially
located behind hills and which are out of radio con-
tact with respect to the other nodes.
At intervals of 1 second, an unconnected node de-
termines the slope of the surface in the 8 cardinal
compass directions and moves along a line orthog-
onal to the line of steepest ascent. An unconnected
node therefore moves around the hill until it makes
radio contact. Other heuristics can be used to com-
pute the movements of disconnected nodes and may
result in more rapid reconnection. The connected
nodes move as described in Section 4.1.
Fig. 10 shows nodes 1 and 4, which are initially
located behind hills and are unconnected, moving
around their respective hills and establishing con-
tact with the other nodes. The nodes then move
autonomously to maximise their throughputs which
results in a motion towards the centre of the net-
work where the nodes form an approximate ring. As
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Fig. 10. A 10-node network where two unconnected nodes
move autonomously to make radio contact: motion on the
surface (upper); (x, y) motion as a function of time (middle);
the total throughput and the total credit balance (lower).
required, the autonomous motion results in an in-
creased throughput. The total credit balance is equal
to the number of nodes.
4.3. Interpretation
The pattern of movement which arises when the
nodes move autonomously in order to maximise
their credit balances is fundamentally different from
the pattern which arises when the nodes move to
maximise their throughputs. In the latter case, the
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nodes move closer together in order to reduce the
power needed to transmit data, but on the other
hand proximity increases radio interference, which
has a negative effect on connectivity. Maximizing
the credit balance induces a distribution of the
nodes throughout the area: in particular, a node s
at the periphery moves towards the edge of the net-
work. To understand this behaviour, we examine
the impact of such a motion on the payments made
and payments received by a node.
First we observe that when node s moves to the
edge of the network, the distance between node s
and most (if not all) of the other nodes will increase.
Node s will therefore need more power to transmit
data, and the price of power at node s will increase.
This in turn will lead to a reduction in the payments
made by node s to other nodes, and an increase in
the payments received by node s from other nodes.
The payments made by an originating node s to
other nodes for originating calls are reduced. Con-
sider a node s at the origin of route r. If node s
moves towards the edge of the network, then the
price of power at node swill increase. The price µr(t)
of route r will increase and the data rate yr(t) =
ws(t)/µr(t) of the originating call on route r will
decrease since node s’s willingness to pay ws(t) for
data transmission is a constant share of its credit
balance bs(t): thus ws(t) = αbs(t).
When computing the cost of an originating call
on route r, since the increased costs of route r are
incurred at node s only, the source node s is able to
retain a relatively higher share of its willingness-to-
pay ws(t) (the originating node pays for bandwidth
and power congestion costs at the source, transit
and destination; since node s is the source, only the
congestion costs at the transit and the destination
nodes are transferred to other nodes). The payments
made by node s to the other nodes on route r de-
crease.
The payments received by a transit node s from
other nodes for transit calls are increased. Consider
a node s on route r where s 6= O(r). If node s moves
towards the edge of the network, then the price of
power at node s will increase. When computing the
cost of a call on route r, since the increased costs are
incurred at node s only, a relatively higher share of
the willingness-to-pay of the originating node O(r)
is received by the transit node s. The payments re-
ceived by the other nodes on route r decrease.
If the direction of motion of node s that is seek-
ing to maximize its credit balance is based on its
short term income (as computed during the next
time interval), then node s has an incentive to move
to the edge of the network since payments made
to other nodes will decrease and payments received
from other nodes will increase. However, this is a
short-sighted perspective. The movement towards
the edge of the network will degrade the ability of
node s to attract transit calls and hence its long-
term income will decline.
Seeking maximum throughput does not de-
grade the ability of the nodes and the network
to carry transit calls. We therefore conclude that
autonomous motion targeting throughput opti-
mization is better suited for organizing the spatial
distribution of the mobile nodes. The motion model
is one-step look-ahead: it takes only the current call
occupancy into account and does not consider the
effect of future calls. In contrast to the case of credit
balance maximization, an optimal throughput-
maximizing decision based on the next period has
no adverse impact on a longer time scale.
5. Conclusion
This paper has considered an ad hoc network in
which nodes are given incentives to collaborate. We
rely on a framework that was developed in [2], which
we augmented with a radio interference model. Each
node has a credit balance; credits are spent when a
node sends or receives traffic, and credits are earned
when a node acts as source, transit or destination
node.
Our first focus was on mutual cooperation issues:
nodes that are located near the centre of the network
are considerably better off, compared to nodes at
the periphery, since nodes near the centre are more
likely to serve as transit nodes, and therefore earn
more credits. We proposed a number of remedies
for this effect. The efficacy of these remedies was
assessed in a detailed performance study.
The second topic that we addressed concerned
so-called “autonomous motion”. Our model allows
us to study the optimal compromise for the nodes
between being close together (to reduce the power
costs of transmission) and being further apart (to
reduce radio interference). We investigated how the
nodes would move if they were to optimize some
utility function such as their credit balance, or their
throughput. Through simulation experiments we in-
vestigated the evolution of the position of the nodes
as a function of time. Some of the simulations take
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a 3D model of the terrain into account where simple
heuristics are used to establish connectivity, start-
ing from a disconnected situation. We observe that,
depending on the choice of the utility function, the
positions of the nodes converge to non-trivial opti-
mal operating points.
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Glossary
Notation
S, D the set of source, destination nodes
O(r), D(r) the originating and the destination
node of route r
fr(i) the node that node i forwards traffic
to on route r
σri the signal-to-interference ratio for a
signal sent from node i to the next
node fr(i) along route r
RS(s), RD(s), RT (s) the set of routes that originate, ter-
minate, transit at node s
Ns(t) the number of calls originating from
node s at time t
xs(t) the flow sent by a source node s at
time t
yr(t), Yri(t) the net flow sent along route r at
time t, the gross flow sent from node i
to node fr(i) at time t
cj(t), γj(t) the bandwidth, power in use at
node j at time t
ws(t), bs(t) the willingness-to-pay for congestion
costs incurred at node s at time t,
the credit balance at node s at time t
µrj(t), µr(t) the price at node j for carrying a unit
of flow along route r at time t, the
price at node O(r) for carrying a unit
of flow end-to-end along route r at
time t
µP
j
(t), µB
j
(t) the power, bandwidth congestion
price at node j at time t
zi the (x, y) location of node i
d the Euclidean distance ||zi − zj ||2
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Constants
pi = 10−3 W/Mbps the power radiated per unit flow
by a call at node i
∆ = 0.01 s the update interval for prices,
credit balances and flows
ℓ(d) = kd−u the attenuation function where
k = 1.82× 10−14 and u = 3.52
W = 3.84Mbps the chip rate of the spreading code
N0 = 10−13 the power of the thermal back-
ground noise
L = 60 bits the packet size
αs = 0.3 s−1 the willingness-to-pay factor
β = 0.01 s−1 the credit balance discount factor
η = 1 the code orthogonality factor
κ = 0.05 s−1 the bandwidth and power conges-
tion price factor
Cj = 10.0Mbps the target bandwidth usage at
node j
Γj = 0.5W the target power usage at node j
erx = 10−3 W/Mbps the power consumed per unit flow
when receiving
etxij = max(10
−2, 10−4d2) the power consumed per unit flow
when transmitting from node i to
node j
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